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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent-Appellee Employers' Reinsurance Func} ("ERF") agrees with the 
statement of jurisdiction contained in the brief of Petitioner^- Appellants Larsen Beverage 
and/or Globe Indemnity Company (together "Larsen Beverage" or "Appellants"), except 
to clarify that the Court's jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Annotated section 78A-
4-103 (2009), section 78-2a-3 having been recodified, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the Utah Labor Commission ("Labor Commission") erred 
by affirming Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's ("Jucjge La Jeunesse" or "ALJ") 
Final Order of Permanent Total Disability ("Order") where JLarsen Beverage had 
previously stipulated to the relief granted. 
Standard of Review: ERF agrees with the standard of review set forth by 
Larsen Beverage. 
2. Issue: Whether the non-inclusion of Larsen Beverage's Pre-Trial 
Disclosures in the Record violated Larsen Beverage's due ptocess rights where: (a) the 
Pre-Trial Disclosures were on file with the Labor Commission; (b) Larsen Beverage had 
presented its position to the Labor Commission; (c) Larsen leverage stipulated to the 
relief granted by the Labor Commission; and (d) Larsen Beyerage's Motion to 
Supplement Record was granted, fully correcting any claimed error. 
Standard of Review: ERF agrees with the standard of review set forth by 
Larsen Beverage. 
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Larsen Beverage has also raised a third issue for review in the argument section of 
its brief—i.e., the sufficiency of the Order's factual findings and conclusions of law. (Br. 
of Appellants at 38.) ERF does not believe this is a separate issue since Larsen Beverage 
stipulated to the result obtained, as discussed more folly below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the interpretation of a stipulation between the parties regarding 
the payment of permanent total disability benefits to an employee injured in an industrial 
accident. Applicant Danna Hutchison was employed for Larsen Beverage and injured her 
back while performing her duties. The parties entered into a Stipulation and Order of 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability ("Stipulated Order") regarding the payment of 
benefits to Ms. Hutchison. Such stipulations were commonly made under Utah Code 
Annotated section 35-1-67(5), leaving open only the issue of possible rehabilitation. In 
this case, there was a clearly stated bargain: Larsen Beverage agreed to pay "all" of Ms. 
Hutchison's medical expenses related to the accident while ERF agreed to pay all 
permanent total disability benefits, accruing after March 1, 2004. The parties stipulated 
that Ms. Hutchison was entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total disability. The 
finding of permanent total disability (and ERF's payments based on that finding) was 
tentative because the law in effect at the time required that the injured worker be 
evaluated by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation before a final order was entered. 
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Larsen Beverage now seeks to undo the Stipulated Order. It claims that the entire 
agreement was tentative, including its unconditional agreement to pay all of Ms. 
Hutchison's medical expenses. Larsen Beverage asked the | ALJ and Labor Commission 
(and now asks this Court) to order ERF to reimburse it for ]Us. Hutchison's medical 
expenses. However, the terms of the Stipulated Order are c^ lear and unambiguous; they 
do not entitle Larsen Beverage to the relief it seeks. There \s no provision in the 
Stipulated Order for a reevaluation of the division of liability between Larsen Beverage 
and ERF after the permanent total disability to which Larse^i Beverage had stipulated was 
confirmed by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. Neither is there any provision in 
the Stipulated Order related to reimbursement by ERF of medical expenses. The only 
condition in the Stipulated Order was that Ms. Hutchison bd evaluated by the Utah State 
Office of Rehabilitation and the effect such evaluation migl^t have on the term of ERF's 
future payments. Both the ALJ and Labor Commission properly interpreted the 
Stipulated Order and held Larsen Beverage to the deal it made. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Belqw 
Ms. Hutchison initiated this action on July 1, 2004, b^ filing an Application for 
Hearing with the Labor Commission. (R. at 1.) Ms. Hutchi$on claimed permanent total 
compensation for an injury she sustained while working for (Larsen Beverage. (R. at 1.) 
Following mediation in March 2005, the parties entered into the Stipulated Order. (R. at 
52-56.) Counsel for all parties, including Larsen Beverage, reviewed and signed the 
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Stipulated Order, indicating their agreement. (R. at 55,) The Stipulation was then 
approved by Administrative Law Judge Donald L. George on April 29, 2005. (R. at 54.) 
In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed that Ms. Hutchison was "entitled to a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability" and that she would be referred to the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation for vocational rehabilitation training, (R. at 53.) The 
Stipulated Order required ERF to pay Ms. Hutchison permanent total disability 
compensation commencing March 1, 2004, "and continuing until further order of the 
Labor Commission." (R. at 53.) Larsen Beverage unconditionally agreed to pay "all 
medical expenses resulting from the industrial accident" suffered by Ms. Hutchison, (R. 
at 53.) 
Under the statute in effect at the time of Ms. Hutchison's injury, a finding of 
permanent total disability was in all cases tentative until the injured employee completed 
vocational rehabilitation evaluation by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1993). The only condition in the Stipulated Order concerned Ms. 
Hutchison's vocational rehabilitation. (See R. at 54.) The Stipulated Order provides that 
Ms. Hutchison would participate in vocational rehabilitation and, depending on the 
outcome of her rehabilitation efforts, the entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation could be revisited by the Labor Commission. Larsen Beverage's 
agreement to pay Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses was not contingent upon any 
subsequent event and, thus, no conditions were recited in the order portion of the 
Stipulated Order. (See R. at 53-54.) In particular, the Stipulated Order did not provide 
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for any reimbursement of medical expenses to Larsen Beverage nor did it provide for an 
apportionment of future medical expenses incurred by Ms. Hutchison as a result of the 
industrial accident. 
In March 2006, Judge George retired and Administrative Law Judge Richard M. 
La Jeunesse was assigned to the case. On March 15, 2006, Judge La Jeunesse entered an 
order terminating payment of permanent total disability benefits to Ms. Hutchison 
because she failed to cooperate with the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. (R. at 64-
65.) After later participating in the vocational rehabilitation process, Ms. Hutchison 
moved for reinstatement of her permanent total disability benefits. (R. at 69.) Judge La 
Jeunesse granted the motion and payment of benefits to Ms. Hutchison was "reinstated 
pursuant to the April 2005 Stipulation and Order approved tfy Judge Donald L. George." 
(R. at 72.) 
A hearing was held on January 29, 2007, to consider |Ms. Hutchison's vocational 
rehabilitation. (See R. at 102, 105. See also R. vol. 5 (hearing transcript).)1 Prior to the 
1
 Larsen Beverage claims that Judge George, not Judge La Jeunesse, presided at the 
January 2007 hearing. (Br. of Appellants at 15-16.) Nothing in the Record supports this 
contention. The notices of the hearing indicate that it was to be held before Judge La 
Jeunesse. (R. at 102, 105.) Larsen Beverage sent a letter to Judge La Jeunesse requesting 
that the original hearing date be rescheduled due to a scheduling conflict. (R. at 103.) 
Two weeks before the hearing, Larsen Beverage forwarded a copy of the supplemental 
medical exhibit to Judge la Jeunesse. (R. at 106.) Judge La Jeunesse is identified as the 
judge on the hearing transcript, (R. vol. 5), and he issued the Order following the hearing, 
(R. at 107-10). In his written opinions, Judge La Jeunesse was careful to distinguish 
between those portions of the case over which he and Judge George respectively 
presided. (Seef e.g., R. at 108.) The Record indicates that Ji^dge La Jeunesse was the 
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hearing, Larsen Beverage submitted its Pre-Trial Disclosure Form, asking for 
reimbursement from ERF of haif of all medical expenses in excess of $20,000, contrary 
to the prior agreement of the parties as set forth in the Stipulated Order. (R. at 105(b).) 
At the hearing, Larsen Beverage apparently requested reimbursement of medical 
expenses, contrary to the terms of the Stipulated Order. (R. vol. 5 at 4.) Notably, Larsen 
Beverage did not contest the permanent total disability status of Ms. Hutchison, the only 
issue left open by the Stipulated Order, and agreed that benefits to her "should be 
continued as they have been to-date." (R. vol. 5 at 4:18-21.) Judge La Jeunesse indicated 
that he would issue an order of ongoing permanent total disability and appropriate 
reimbursement. (R. vol. 5 at 5.) 
The order requested by Larsen Beverage was not issued. Instead, apparently 
having an opportunity to fully review the file, including the Stipulated Order, Judge La 
Jeunesse issued the Order, confirming and integrating the parties' Stipulated Order. (R. 
at 107-10.) Judge La Jeunesse adopted the facts to which the parties stipulated in the 
Stipulated Order and determined that Ms. Hutchison could not be vocationally 
rehabilitated. (R. at 109.) Judge La Jeunesse also noted Larsen Beverage's stipulation at 
the January 2007 hearing "that Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability compensation 
benefits should continue pursuant to the 2005 Order." (R. at 109.) Based on those 
only administrative law judge involved in the case after march 2006 (including at the 
January 2007 hearing). (See R. at 62-131.) It is unlikely that Judge George participated 
in the hearing over a year after his retirement. 
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findings, Judge La Jeunesse resolved the only tentative aspect of the Stipulated Order 
(i.e., Ms. Hutchison's vocational rehabilitation and its effeqt on ERPs payment of 
benefits), and ordered ERF to pay permanent total compensation to Ms. Hutchison. (R. at 
109.) Judge La Jeunesse also ordered Larsen Beverage to pay Ms. Hutchison "all" 
medical expenses related to her industrial accident, as previously agreed in the Stipulated 
Order. (R. at 109.) 
On May 9, 2007, Larsen Beverage moved for relief from the Order or, 
alternatively, to alter or amend the Order under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. at 112-15.) Larsen Beverage argued that Order contained legal 
errors. Specifically, it argued that the Stipulated Order was fc tentative agreement and 
could not form the basis for the final determination of benefits to be paid to Ms. 
Hutchison. (R. at 115.) Larsen Beverage also argued that ElRF should be ordered to 
reimburse Larsen Beverage for Ms. Hutchison's past medic4l expenses and for allocation 
of future medical expenses. (R. at 112.) 
Before Judge La Jeunesse had a chance to rule on its ^notion, Larsen Beverage 
filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, advancing the same arguments. 
(R. at 118-20.) ERF filed a Memorandum in Opposition to potion for Review, arguing 
that Larsen Beverage stipulated to the division of liability adapted by Judge La Jeunesse. 
(R. at 125.) ERF also argued that the only condition in the Stipulated Order was the 
requirement that Ms. Hutchinson be evaluated by the Utah S^ate Office of Rehabilitation 
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and that there was no provision for revisiting the allocation of responsibility as between 
ERF and Larsen Beverage. (R. at 126.) 
On review, the Labor Commission held that the Stipulated was an enforceable 
agreement between the parties and that Larsen Beverage had agreed to pay all of Ms. 
Hutchison's medical expenses. (R. at 130-31.) The Labor Commission rejected Larsen 
Beverage's argument that it was entitled to reimbursement and allocation of medical 
expenses simply because the Stipulated Order left open the issue of vocational 
rehabilitation. (R. at 131.) Rather, the Stipulated Order "clearly shows that Larsen 
[Beverage] intended to be responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the 
accident." (R. at 131.) The Labor Commission further noted that "the only condition 
within the agreement based Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability compensation on 
presenting herself for evaluation with the State Office of Rehabilitation . . . . The 
evidence does not support Larsen[ Beverage's] position that it agreed to be bound based 
on tentative conditions . . . . " (R. at 131.) The Labor Commission therefore affirmed the 
Order requiring "Larsen [Beverage] to pay all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses 
reasonably related to the accident." (R. at 131.) This appeal followed. 
III. Statement of Facts 
L Ms. Hutchison injured her lower back in an industrial accident on August 
23, 1993, while working for Larsen Beverage. (R. at 1.) 
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2. Ms. Hutchison previously suffered a back injury in 1984 that resulted in a 
10% whole person impairment "based on the Labor Commission Impairment Guides." 
(R. at 52.) 
3. As a result of these injuries and several resulting surgeries, Ms. Hutchison 
was awarded a 20% whole person impairment on December 9, 1999. (R. at 23.) 
4. Ms. Hutchison was again evaluated on March 4, 2004, and she was deemed 
"totally disabled;' (R. vol. 2 at 107.) 
5- On July 1, 2004, Ms. Hutchison filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Labor Commission. (R. at 1.) 
6. Following mediation, ERF and Larsen Beverage resolved the issues of 
responsibility for payment of medical expenses and ongoing permanent total disability 
benefits. Their agreement was set forth in the Stipulated Order which was approved by 
counsel for all parties. (R. at 52-55.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Labor Commission Properly Affirmed the Order Because Larsen 
Beverage Agreed to the Relief Granted, 
Larsen Beverage first claims that the ALJ and Labor (Commission erred by 
rejecting Larsen Beverage's claim for reimbursement of me4ical expenses from ERF. 
(Br. of Appellants at 23.) Larsen Beverage argues that reimbursement was required 
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because its agreement in the Stipulated Order to pay Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses 
was tentative. Larsen Beverage argues, in essence, that the Stipulated Order is 
ambiguous. (Br. of Appellants at 30.) It is not. Essentially, Larsen Beverage's claim is 
that because the Stipulated Order contains the word "tentative," referring to Ms. 
Hutchison's disability status, all other provisions of the agreement are also tentative. 
This argument should be rejected because it contravenes the plain terms of the Stipulated 
Order. 
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipulations between the parties. Year gin, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm % 2001 UT 11, % 19, 20 P.3d 287. See also 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) (noting 
that "[settlements are favored, and should be encouraged," and that "[i]t is quite well 
established" courts have authority to enforce settlement agreements). Similarly binding 
are stipulations entered into in administrative proceedings. Year gin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of the Utah State Tax Comm n, 2001 UT 11, ] 19, 20 P.3d 287.2 
The Yeargin court also noted that courts are hesitant "to relieve a party from a 
stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel" and that a stipulation 
should only be set aside under certain conditions, including a showing "that the 
stipulation was entered into inadvertently." Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah 
State Tax Comm % 2001 UT 11, % 21, 20 P.3d 287 (quotation marks omitted). 
Inadvertence, however, "cannot be the basis for repudiation when the mistake was due to 
failure to exercise due diligence, [or if it could] have been avoided by the exercise of 
ordinary care." Id., 20 P.3d 287 (alteration in original and quotation marks omitted). The 
court stated that "it is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court 
was entered into inadvertently." Id, 20 P.3d 287 (quotation marks omitted). 
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As Larsen Beverage correctly points out, the general rules of contract 
interpretation guide a court's analysis of a stipulation or settlement agreement. A court's 
purpose in construing a contract is to ascertain the parties' intentions, which are 
controlling, and courts look to the writing itself to ascertainl those intentions. WebBank v. 
Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ffi[ 17-18, 54 P^d 1139. Where the language 
used in the contract is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a 
matter of law." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2006 UT 20, f|21, 133 P.3d 428 (quotation 
marks omitted). A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies." Daines v. Vincent, 200$ UT 51, \ 25, 190 P.3d 1269 
(quotation marks omitted). 
The terms of the Stipulated Order are plain and unambiguous; they clearly set 
forth the parties' intentions. After setting forth the underlying facts, the Stipulated Order 
provides that "based on her impairment from the accident off August 23, 1993, the parties 
conclude [Ms. Hutchison] is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total disability." 
(R. at 53.) The parties acknowledged that Ms. Hutchison wcHild "be referred to the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation Services for rehabilitation trailing as provided by Section 
35-1-67." (R. at 53.) ERF agreed to place Ms. Hutchison on its payroll and pay her 
"permanent total disability benefits at the rate of $227 per week commencing March 1, 
2004 and continuing until further order of the Labor Commission." (R. at 53.) Larsen 
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Beverage agreed to "be responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the industrial 
accident of August 23, 1993." (R. at 53.) In the order portion of the Stipulated Order, 
Judge George ordered ERF to pay Ms. Hutchison permanent total disability benefits with 
"[s]aid benefits to continue until further order of the Labor Commission." (R. at 54.) He 
also ordered Ms. Hutchison to attend rehabilitation training. (R. at 54.) Significantly, 
counsel for all parties signed the Stipulated Order confirming their "APPROVAL OF 
STIPULATION AND ORDER." (R. at 55 (emphasis added).) 
There is no ambiguity with respect to Larsen Beverage's obligation. It agreed to 
pay all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses. This obligation was not conditional and 
"air' is not an ambiguous term, see Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 
162, f^ 28, 92 P.3d 768. Larsen Beverage points to the word"tentative" and the term 
"until further order of the Labor Commission" to argue that its duty was conditional. 
(E.g., Br. of Appellants at 30, 33-34.) Each instance cited by Larsen Beverage, however, 
relates to an obligation of Ms. Hutchison or ERF regarding rehabilitation and permanent 
total disability benefits. The Stipulated Order does not provide Larsen Beverage's 
obligation will continue until further order of the Labor Commission nor does it condition 
the obligation to pay medical benefits upon some future event. The Stipulated Order 
contains no provision allowing the parties to revisit their division of responsibility. The 
sole contingency was Ms. Hutchison's obligation to attend vocational rehabilitation and 
the effect that might have on payments by ERF. Larsen Beverage has not advanced a 
contrary interpretation of the Stipulated Order that is reasonably supported by its terms. 
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See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 5\,% 26, 190 P3d 1269. It unambiguously agreed to pay 
all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses. As the Labor Commission held, "[t]he 
evidence does not support Larsenf Beverage]'s position that it agreed to be bound based 
on tentative conditions. (R. at 131.) 
Larsen Beverage also argues that because the order portion of the Stipulated Order 
does not mention the obligation to pay medical benefits, su^h an obligation must not 
exist. (Br. of Appellants at 34.) This argument, however, proves too much. Under the 
law in effect in 1993, a finding of permanent total disability was in all cases tentative 
until the injured worker underwent an evaluation by the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(5) (1993). Thus^ the finding of Ms. 
Hutchison's permanent total disability was tentative until sh£ could undergo the 
evaluation. Judge George ordered her to do so. Because th0 finding of permanent total 
disability was tentative, the duration of ERF's promise to pajy permanent total disability 
was left open, conditioned on the results of Ms. Hutchison's rehabilitation. Those were 
the only two provisions which were conditional and the onlyi two that needed to be 
recited in the order portion of the Stipulated Order. The remaining terms of the parties' 
bargain, including Larsen Beverage's promise to pay all medical expenses, were already 
finalized and no further order was necessary. 
Larsen Beverage's reliance on Empey v. Industrial Commission, 63 P.2d 630 
(Utah 1937), and Continental Casualty Co, v. Industrial Commission, 210 P. 127 (Utah 
1922), is misplaced. (See Br. of Appellants at 35 & nn.6-7.) While those decisions 
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provide that the Labor Commission does not have jurisdiction to reform an agreement 
they did not hold that "the Commission does not even have the jurisdictional ability to 
enforce or interpret contractual provisions" as claimed by Larsen Beverage. (See Br. of 
Appellants at 35.) In fact, the Continental Casualty court expressly held that the Labor 
Commission has the authority to enforce a contract.3 The court there held that with 
respect to an insurance contract, "[t]he commission had no power to do otherwise than to 
enforce and apply its terms." Cont'l Cas. Co, v. Indus. Comm'n, 210 P. 127, 129 (Utah 
1922) (emphasis added). The court further stated that it is "the duty of the commission to 
enforce the letter of the contract." Cont'l Cas, Co, v. Indus. Comm'n, 210 P. 127, 129 
(Utah 1922) (emphasis added). 
Larsen Beverage's argument is further inapposite because it is based on the 
incorrect assumption that the ALJ and Labor Commission rewrote the Stipulated Order. 
They did not. They simply enforced the agreement as written, as they are empowered 
and, indeed, required, to do. Enforcement of the Stipulated Order will not discourage the 
provision of temporary benefits to injured workers as Larsen Beverage predicts. It may, 
however, encourage parties to be careful when entering into contracts. 
Larsen Beverage also claims that the "confusion" regarding the interpretation of 
the Stipulated Order may have resulted from the transfer of the case from Judge George 
3
 The language quoted by Larsen Beverage in footnote 6 of its brief is itself a quotation 
by the Empey court of the holding in Continental Casualty, See Empey v. Indus, 
Comm'n, 63 P.2d 630, 635 (Utah 1937). 
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to Judge La Jeunesse. (Br. of Appellants at 29.) Larsen Beverage seems to argue that 
this transfer occurred after the January 2007 hearing. Nothing in the Record, however, 
supports the argument that Judge George presided at the Jaiiuary 2007 hearing. The 
Record suggests just the opposite—i.e., that it was Judge La Jeunesse who presided at the 
hearing. The transfer of the case to Judge La Jeunesse followed Judge George's 
retirement which occurred more than a year before the hearing. (See supra note 1.) 
Even if Judge George did preside at the hearing, thatl fact provides no relief to 
Larsen Beverage. While the ALJ may have indicated at the] hearing he would consider 
issuing an order of reimbursement, no order of reimbursem0nt ever issued. Rather, after 
having a chance to carefully review the file, including the Stipulated Order, Judge La 
Jeunesse determined that Larsen Beverage already stipulate^ to payments that made 
reimbursement unnecessary and held Larsen Beverage to itsl agreement. Courts are free 
to reconsider or change their prior rulings at any time before final resolution of the case. 
See, e.g., U.R.C.P. 54(b); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 8^4 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Larsen Beverage's claim that the ALJ overlooked or was unaware of its 
claim for reimbursement is speculative at best. Larsen Beverage's stipulation made it 
unnecessary to make findings under the allocation statute—Ijarsen Beverage agreed "be 
responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the industrial accident." (R. at 53.) 
4
 Neither is their Record support for the claim that the Labor Commission overlooked 
Larsen Beverage's request for reimbursement. (See Br. of AJppellants at 30.) The Labor 
Commission specifically addressed Larsen Beverage's arguihent "that it is entitled to 
reimbursement and allocation for medical expenses." (R. at 131.) 
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The Order was plainly not the effect of any confusion following the transfer of the case to 
Judge La Jeunesse. 
The ALJ and Labor Commission had no obligation to order reimbursement of 
medical expenses under the statute because Larsen Beverage agreed to pay "all" of them. 
See Pacheco v. Indus. Comm % 668 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1983) (affirming Labor 
Commission's enforcement of settlement agreement and decision not to award statutory 
interest available to claimants under the Workers' Compensation Act where parties did 
not include a provision for interest in their agreement). Larsen Beverage has failed to 
identify any authority requiring reimbursement or application of section 35-1-67(5) 
(1993) in all cases. 
In essence, Larsen Beverage waived its claim for reimbursement. Waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Red Cliffs Corner, LLC v. J.J. Hunan, Inc., 
2009 UT App 240, ^ 33, 219 P.3d 619. Larsen Beverage knew of the potential 
reimbursement for medical expenses prior to entering into the Stipulated Order-it had 
asserted such a claim in its Answer. (R. at 40.) Even so, Larsen Beverage expressly 
approved the Stipulated Order, demonstrating its intent to relinquish that right by 
agreeing unconditionally to pay "all" medical expenses. 
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II. The Court May Similarly Reject Larsen Beverage's Arguments Regarding 
the Adequacy of the Order and Due Process Violation, 
A. The Court need not consider the remaining issues presented by Larsen 
Beverage because they are raised for the fiirst time on appeal and 
inadequately briefed. 
The Court need not consider the two remaining issues raised by Larsen Beverage. 
The first is the alleged violation of Larsen Beverage's due process rights. (Br. of 
Appellants at 2, 39-40.) The other, although not identified ^s an issue presented for 
review, (see Br. of Appellants at 1-2), is Larsen Beverage's claim that Order's factual 
findings and conclusions of law are inadequate, (Br. of Appellants at 38). The Court may 
disregard these issues for a number of reasons. 
First, Larsen Beverage raises both the adequacy of thb Order and due process 
issues for the first time on appeal. It does not appear from the Record that these issues 
were argued before either the ALJ or Labor Commission. T i^e Court need not consider 
an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Ortiz v. Indus, Cpmm 'n of Utah, 766 P.2d 
1092, 1094 (Utah Ct App. 1989). See also State v. Dudley, \U1 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) ("[T]he proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis 
of state constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, p o t . . . for the first time on 
appeal." (quotation marks omitted)). And Larsen Beverage lias not argued that the 
exceptions to this rule (i.e., plain error or exceptional circumstances) are applicable in 
this case. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, f 5, 63 P.3d 6^. 
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In addition, Larsen Beverage has failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Larsen Beverage did not identify the standard of review 
for its third issue (adequacy of the Order) as required by Rule 24(a)(5). Additionally, 
Larsen Beverage failed to comply with subsection (A) of Rule 24(a)(5) which requires a 
"citation to the record showing that the issue [presented for review] was preserved" 
below. None of the three issues identified by Larsen Beverage includes the required 
citation. (See Br. of Appellants at 1-2, 38.). Courts need not address the merits of a 
party's argument if the party's brief fails to comply with Rule 24. See, e.g., Utah R. App. 
P. 24(k); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 198-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Beyond the deficiencies described above, Larsen Beverage provides no citation to 
any authority for either of the two remaining issues, rendering the arguments inadequate. 
See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22, 128 P.3d 1179 ("An adequate brief is one that fully 
identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal authority."); Burns v. 
Summer hays, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("In this case, in which the 
appellant has failed to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support of 
his claims, appellant's assertions do not permit appellate review."). For example, Larsen 
Beverage does not specify whether its due process claim is made under the federal or 
state constitution. "For the court to consider a . . . constitutional claim, a litigant must at 
least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal 
precedent supports its position." Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, % 74, 73 
P.3d 334. "Mere allusion to . . . constitutional claims, unsupported by meaningful 
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analysis, does not permit appellate review." State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). Larsen Beverage's conclusory arguments do pot permit appropriate review 
and the Court therefore need not consider them. Nevertheless, ERF addresses these 
issues below. 
B. The Order contains adequate findings of f^ct and conciusions of law. 
Larsen Beverage's second point is that the Order do^s not contain adequate factual 
findings. (Br. of Appellants at 38.) Larsen Beverage also states that the Order is contrary 
to the evidence. (Br. of Appellants at 23.) But its argument is unavailing. "[Findings of 
fact 'must show that the court's judgment or decree follows! logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence.'" Strate v. Labor Comm % 20016 UT App 179, ffl[ 16, 21, 136 
P.3d 1273. The Order follows logically from the evidence Here, specifically the 
unambiguous terms of the parties' written agreement. Further, if a litigant does not 
directly challenge any of the factual findings, appellate courts "will assume that they are 
supported by the record and [will] not disturb them." Amerlfemps, Inc. v. Labor 
Comm % 2005 UT App 491, \ 27, 128 P.3d 31.5 
Judge La Jeunesse adopted in his Order the facts set ffarth in the Stipulated Order. 
The Stipulated Order clearly sets forth the underlying facts that resulted in a finding of 
permanent total disability and an award of benefits. (R. at 5 £-53.) The Stipulated Order 
5
 As the Court also noted in Ameritemps, even if Larsen Beverage had directly challenged 
the factual findings, it failed to satisfy its duty to marshal the evidence, risking the 
Court's refusal to consider the argument. See Ameritemps, Ike. v. Labor Common, 2005 
UT App 491, f 27 n.5, 128 P.3d 31. 
19 
describes Ms. Hutchison's industrial injury, prior injury, and attempts to treat them. (R. 
at 52.) The Stipulated Order also describes Ms. Hutchison's salary and the status of me 
parties to this case. (R. at 53.) Simply because the Stipulated Order does not contain a 
separate section titled "Findings of Fact," does not render the stipulated facts inadequate, 
as Larsen Beverage seems to argue. (See Br. of Appellants at 38.) 
Moreover, there was no dispute as to the underlying facts—Larsen Beverage 
stipulated to them all. Larsen Beverage also stipulated that il would pay "all" of Ms. 
Hutchison's medical expenses. Larsen Beverage's complaint does not seem to be with 
the facts underlying the Order, but with the agreement it made by entering into the 
Stipulated Order. Its regret, however, provides no basis on which to claim that the factual 
findings in the Order are inadequate or to unwind the Stipulated Order. The facts set 
forth in the Stipulated Order and incorporated into the Order are "sufficiently detailed" 
and support the ultimate conclusion reached by Judge La Jeunesse. See Strate v. Labor 
Comm ,n,2006UTApp 179,121, 136P.3d 1273. 
The Order similarly sets forth adequate conclusions of law. After the parties 
entered into the Stipulated Order, the issue remaining for decision was the tentative 
finding of Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability, which was conditioned on her 
vocational rehabilitation. The January 2007 hearing was held to address that issue. (See 
R. at 105 (providing notice of hearing to "Consider the Opinion of the Utah State Office 
of Rehabilitation").) Again, Larsen Beverage stipulated to the conclusions adopted in the 
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Order. Judge La Jeunesse then resolved the remaining issiie concerning Ms. Hutchison's 
rehabilitation. (R. at 109.) 
Judge La Jeunesse was aware of Larsen Beverage's Argument regarding 
reimbursement, both from its Pre-Trial Disclosures and discussion at the January 2007 
hearing. But he, and later the Labor Commission, determined that the Stipulated Order 
was controlling. They considered, and rejected, Larsen Beverage's claim for 
reimbursement. This is illustrated by the fact that Judge La Jeunesse indicated he would 
consider ordering but later determined to hold Larsen Beverage to the terms of its 
agreement. The Order even quotes paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Order, setting forth 
Larsen Beverage's agreement to pay "all" of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses related to 
the industrial accident. The Order contains adequate conclusions of law and Larsen 
Beverage's renewed attempt here to undo the deal it bargained for must be rejected. 
C, The due process claim is without merit 
Larsen Beverage's final argument is that the Labor Commission erred by omitting 
Larsen Beverage's Pre-Trial Disclosures from the Record. (|Br. of Appellants at 39.) But 
Larsen Beverage has provided no authority suggesting that the exclusion of material from 
the Record constitutes a violation of due process rights. It seems instead that the issue is 
not whether Larsen Beverage was afforded due process, but whether Judge La Jeunesse 
and the Labor Commission were aware of Larsen Beverage'$ claim for reimbursement. 
(See R. at 40 ("[I]t would appear that ALJ LaJeunesse [sic] cjid not have all the necessary 
information to review the justiciable matters for review . . . .'f).) Stated another way, 
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because the Pre-Trial Disclosures were not included in the Record prepared for this 
appeal, Judge La Jeunesse must not have been aware of them when he issued the Order. 
This claim is baseless. 
Judge La Jeunesse was well-aware of Larsen Beverage's argument regarding 
reimbursement. According to Larsen Beverage, the claim was presented in writing in 
both its Answer and Pre-Trial Disclosures. (Br. of Appellants at 10, 39.) Although the 
Pre-Trial Disclosures may have been omitted from the appellate Record, Larsen Beverage 
acknowledges that they were entered into the Labor Commission's system and therefore 
were part of the Labor Commission File. (R. at 40.) 
The reimbursement argument was again presented to the Labor Commission as it 
reviewed Judge La Jeunesse's Order. (R. at 118-20.) The Labor Commission reviewed 
and specifically addressed Larsen Beverage's claim. (R. at 131.) The omission of the 
Pre-Trial Disclosures from the Record on appeal in no way indicates that Judge La 
Jeunesse or the Labor Commission failed to consider Larsen Beverage's claim for 
reimbursement; Larsen Beverage's claims to the contrary are speculative. Larsen 
Beverage fails to show how the decisions of Judge La Jeunesse or the Labor Commission 
would have been different had the Pre-Trial Disclosures been included in the Record on 
appeal, particularly where those decisions all preceded the compilation of the Record. 
Further, and importantly, ERF agreed to the result sought by Larsen Beverage's motion 
to supplement the record. The motion was granted, thus correcting any purported error 
on appeal. Larsen Beverage's due process claim is therefore meritless. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ERF requests that the decision of the Utah Labor 
Commission be affirmed. 
Dated this ^ 5 til day of August 2010. 
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